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We discuss the potential of quantum key distribution (QKD) for long distance communication
by proposing a new analysis of the errors caused by dark counts. We give sufficient conditions for
a considerable improvement of the key generation rates and the security thresholds of well-known
QKD protocols such as Bennett-Brassard 1984, Phoenix-Barnett-Chefles 2000, and the six-state
protocol. This analysis is applicable to other QKD protocols like Bennett 1992. We examine two
scenarios: a sender using a perfect single-photon source and a sender using a Poissonian source.
PACS numbers: 03.67Dd
The goal of quantum key distribution (QKD) is to ex-
tend a shared secret key for use as a one-time pad to
encode classical messages. The advantage of QKD is
that its security is based on the laws of quantum me-
chanics and not on the unproven complexity of a mathe-
matical problem as in classical cryptography. These last
few years, many encouraging experiments demonstrated
QKD, some spanning more than a hundred kilometers
through optical fibers [1]. The main source of errors is
usually due to dark counts from the detectors. A dark
count is when a detector fires independently (or in the
absence) of a qubit state encoded by the sender, Alice.
If qubit losses are considerable, then the receiver, Bob,
will receive many empty pulses, and dark counts from his
detectors will induce a high error rate.
In this paper, for simplicity, we refer specifically
only to four different QKD protocols: Bennett 1992
(B92), Phoenix-Barnett-Chefles 2000 (PBC00), Bennett-
Brassard 1984 (BB84), and the six-state protocol, which
are two, three, four, and six state protocols, respec-
tively [2, 3, 4, 5]. In B92, Alice encodes random bits using
two non-orthogonal states, say |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉, and sends
them to Bob. He makes the measurement correspond-
ing to the Positive Operator-Valued Measure (POVM)
{α|ψ1〉〈ψ1|, α|ψ2〉〈ψ2|, 1 −α|ψ1〉〈ψ1|−α|ψ2〉〈ψ2|}, where
|ψj〉 is orthogonal to |ψj〉 and α equals
1
1+|〈ψ1|ψ2〉| . Bob’s
measurement either determines which state Alice did not
send (from which Bob can deduce the encoded bit) or is
inconclusive. PBC00 is similar to B92 but uses three non-
orthogonal states, say |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 and |ψ3〉, that form an
equilateral triangle in the X-Z plane of the Bloch sphere.
She encodes her random bits using random bases from
either {|ψ1〉, |ψ2〉}, {|ψ2〉, |ψ3〉}, or {|ψ3〉, |ψ1〉}. Bob per-
forms the POVM { 2
3
|ψ1〉〈ψ1|,
2
3
|ψ2〉〈ψ2|,
2
3
|ψ3〉〈ψ3|}. Af-
ter Bob measures all of the qubits, Alice declares publicly
which basis she used for each. By deduction, Bob can
sometimes retrieve Alice’s state. Alice and Bob discard
the other results. It can be shown that, neglecting the
qubit losses, the rate of conclusive results is 1
2−ex where
ex is the bit error rate. A conclusive result corresponds
to any pair of qubits not discarded by Alice and Bob.
To implement BB84, Alice encodes a random bit in
either {|0〉, |1〉} or its conjugate basis {|+〉, |−〉}. For
each qubit, Bob randomly measures in one of these bases.
They only keep results for which they used the same ba-
sis. The six-state protocol is identical to BB84 except
that Alice and Bob choose from three different bases:
{|0〉, |1〉},{|+〉, |−〉}, and { 1√
2
(|0〉+ i|1〉), 1√
2
(|0〉 − i|1〉)}.
We can modify BB84 and the six-state protocol by choos-
ing bases with non-equal probabilities, increasing the
chance of agreement [6]. The rate of results for which
identical bases are used converges asymptotically to 1.
Below, we calculate the key generation rates of BB84
and the six-state protocol using this asymptotic result.
Mayers [7] produced the first unconditional security
proof of BB84. Shor and Preskill [8] proposed a simpler
proof based on ideas from Lo and Chau [9]. Their security
proof has been generalized to other protocols including
B92, PBC00, and the six-state protocol [10, 11, 12, 13].
We improve the secret key generation rate of these QKD
protocols by proposing a slight modification of these
proofs. Our main idea is based on a variation of a theo-
rem proved in Ref. [14]. We assume that an eavesdrop-
per, Eve, can perform any attack consistent with quan-
tum mechanics, but cannot get any information about
Alice’s or Bob’s labs or control their apparatus. We dis-
cuss later how realistic these assumptions are and how it
is possible to slightly relax them. We study two cases:
one where Alice’s source can create a single photon on
demand, and another where it follows a Poisson distribu-
tion. For simplicity, we give details only about Shor and
Preskill’s security proof of BB84 and not other protocols.
At the end of this paper, we compare the updated er-
ror rate thresholds and key generation rates of BB84,
PBC00, and the six-state protocol with previous results.
The same arguments could improve other QKD proto-
cols, including B92. However, B92’s phase estimation
bound depends on qubit losses in the channel and the
number of inconclusive results, complicating the analy-
sis. Since our goal is to describe a general technique to
improve security thresholds, we only treat the simpler
cases as examples.
The Shor and Preskill proof first shows the secu-
rity of an entanglement distillation protocol (EDP) for
2QKD, and subsequently reduces the EDP to BB84. For
convenience, we define |Φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|0〉 ± |1〉|1〉) and
|Ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉|1〉 ± |1〉|0〉).
The structure of the EDP that can be reduced to
BB84 in Shor and Preskill’s proof is as follows:
1. Alice creates n pairs of the form |Φ+〉 and sends the
second half of each pair to Bob after randomly applying
the identity or the Hadamard gate on it.
2. After Bob confirms that he has received all of Alice’s
states, Alice publicly declares the random rotation that
she used on each qubit. Bob undoes the transformations
on the corresponding qubits.
3. With no eavesdropping or channel noise, Alice and
Bob will share n perfect pairs of the form |Φ+〉. They
can now measure their qubits in the same basis to share
a secret key. However, noise and eavesdropping induce
errors. If the bit and the phase error rates are low enough,
then error correction can be applied to obtain m perfect
pairs of the form |Φ+〉 where m 6 n.
4. Alice and Bob can estimate the bit error rate by com-
paring bit measurements from a sample of pairs, called
test bits. A bit (or X) error on a pair occurs when Al-
ice and Bob share either |Ψ+〉 or |Ψ−〉. A phase (or
Z) error corresponds to |Φ−〉 or |Ψ−〉. A Y error corre-
sponds to |Φ−〉 or |Ψ+〉. Y error estimation could pro-
vide information about the correlation between bit and
phase errors. Because Alice randomly applies the iden-
tity or Hadamard gate, it can be shown that the bit error
rate, ex, and the phase error rate, ez, are approximately
equal, independent of channel noise and Eve’s strategy.
In BB84, Alice and Bob have no information about Y
errors.
5. Depending on the bit error rate measured on the test
bits, Alice and Bob apply error correction on the other
pairs. If we suppose one-way error correction using CSS
codes [15], a lower bound for generation rate m
n
for the
perfect pairs is given asymptotically by
S = pc[1 −H(ex, ez)] (1)
where H is the Shannon entropy (H(ex, ez) = H(ex) +
H(ez|ex) is the entropy of the bit-phase error pattern)
and pc is the rate of conclusive results. For simplicity, we
assume that the proportion of test bits is negligible. 
Shor and Preskill showed that this EDP, and thus
BB84, were unconditionally secure with a key genera-
tion rate given by Eq. 1. Since H(ex) is asymptotically
the fraction of bits sacrificed for bit error correction, it
implies that H(ez|ex) is an upper bound on the frac-
tion of information that Eve has about the key after bit
error correction. A consequence is that privacy amplifi-
cation, as introduced in Ref. [16], can be used to simplify
the post-processing of the QKD protocol. As shown in
Ref. [17], privacy amplification can generate a secret key
by sacrificing a number of bits asymptotically propor-
tional to Eve’s information.
The reduction of the EDP to BB84 assumes that Alice
uses a source which emits a single photon on demand.
In a more realistic situation, Alice’s source would emit a
photon pulse following a Poisson distribution. Unfortu-
nately, when Alice sends two or more photons containing
the same quantum information at the same time, Eve can
measure one to gain information about the key without
detection. Accounting for this attack (but assuming Eve
has no information about the random phase of the signal
emitted by a coherent light source), a more general equa-
tion of the secret key generation rate, combining results
from Ref. [14] and Ref. [12], and using the improvement
suggested in Ref. [18], is given asymptotically by
S = pc[ω0 + ω1 −H(ex)− ω1H(e
1
z|ex)] (2)
where ω1 is the fraction of the conclusive results cor-
responding to single-photon pulses, ω0 is the fraction of
the conclusive results corresponding to empty pulses (the
presence of background noise, for example), and e1x (e
1
z) is
the bit (phase) error rate restricted to conclusive results
from single-photon pulses. ex (ez) is still the bit (phase)
error rate over all conclusive results. If Alice has a source
that emits a single photon on demand, then ω0 = 0,
ω1 = 1, e
1
j = ej for j ∈ {x, y, z}, and S = pc[1−H(ex, ez)]
as expected.
To prove Eq. 2, it was argued that since Alice and
Bob want an identical key and cannot differentiate multi-
photon from single-photon pulses, they must correct all
bit errors, asymptotically losing a fraction H(ex) of the
results in the process. To apply privacy amplification on
the remaining bits and obtain a secret key, Alice and Bob
must upper bound Eve’s information. If we assume that
the phase of the signal is random1, there is no coherence
between states with different photon numbers. Thus, we
can categorize each bit of the resulting key as being as-
sociated with an empty, single-, or multi-photon pulse.
Assuming the worst case, Eve has full information about
the results associated with multi-photon pulses. On the
other hand, she has no information about Alice’s bits
corresponding to empty pulses. By the Shor-Preskill’s
arguments discussed earlier, the fraction of information
that Eve could extract from the results corresponding to
single-photon pulses is upper bounded byH(e1z|ex). Con-
sequently, Eve’s information about Alice’s remaining key
is upper bounded by (1 − ω0 − ω1) + ω1H(e
1
z|ex). Af-
ter privacy amplification, Eve has no information about
Alice’s key. The same is true of Bob’s key since it is iden-
tical to Alice’s. Therefore, the secret key generation rate
is given by Eq. 2.
Similarly, since Shor-Preskill’s proof can be adapted to
B92, PBC00 and the six-state protocol [10, 11, 12], these
protocols can be shown unconditionally secure with a key
generation rate given by Eq. 2.
1 Recently, it was shown the Eve could use extra information about
the phase of the signal to her advantage [19], though the extent
is unknown.
3The above argument does not differentiate between a
single photon emitted by Alice that is successfully mea-
sured by Bob and a single photon that is lost in the chan-
nel (or taken by Eve) followed by a dark count measured
by Bob. However, these cases may be analyzed sepa-
rately. Consider the following four types of conclusive
results.
1. Successful measurement of a qubit state (physically
corresponding to a photon received from the chan-
nel) that originated from a single-photon pulse.
Note that the qubit state could have been manip-
ulated by Eve.
2. Successful measurement of a qubit state that orig-
inated from a multi-photon pulse.
3. Empty pulses from Alice followed by a successful
measurement of a qubit state by Bob (ie. Eve may
send a qubit state to Bob even if Alice emits noth-
ing).
4. Dark count events: Bob doesn’t receive a qubit
state, but one of his detectors fires.
The dark count events are independent of Alice’s or
Eve’s actions. We define pempc , p
sq
c , and p
mq
c as the
rate of conclusive results corresponding to qubit states,
received by Bob, associated with empty pulses, single-
photon pulses, and multi-photon pulses, respectively. We
define pdkc as the rate of conclusive results associated with
dark counts. Note that
pc = p
emp
c + p
sq
c + p
mq
c + p
dk
c (3)
We remark that the background noise has two differ-
ent contributions: intrinsic and extrinsic. The intrinsic
contribution is caused by elements from Bob’s lab while
the extrinsic contribution is from external sources. The
sun and backscattering light in two-way QKD are exam-
ples of external sources of background noise. Based on
our assumptions, Eve may control the external sources
of background noise, but not the ones inside Bob’s lab.
Following our previous definitions, the only contribution
to pdkc is intrinsic. Any external sources will contribute to
pempc , p
sq
c , and p
mq
c since they correspond to Bob receiv-
ing a qubit state from the channel. For convenience, in
this paper, dark counts always refer to the intrinsic con-
tribution of background noise. We assume for simplicity
that dark counts are independent of other measurement
results.
We now explain how it is possible to achieve a better
bound for the secret key generation rate than Eq. 2. As
before, a fraction H(ex) of the results are lost due to
bit error correction. Assuming again that the phase of
the signal is random from Eve’s perspective, each bit of
the resulting key corresponds to one of the four types of
conclusive results described above. From previous argu-
ments, Eve has a fraction H(esqz |ex) of information about
conclusive results from Category 1 and, in the worst case
scenario, full information about those from Category 2.
esqx and e
sq
z are defined as the bit and phase error rates on
the conclusive results restricted to Category 1. When Al-
ice emits an empty pulse and it is followed by a successful
measurement of a qubit state by Bob, we assume that the
qubit state was created by Eve. A conservative assump-
tion is that Eve has full information about Bob’s results
from Category 3.2 Supposing dark count rates are the
same in all detectors and independent of Eve and other
measurement results, Bob’s results from Category 4 are
completely random and Eve has no information about
them3. Consequently, the fraction of information that
Eve has on Bob’s key after bit error correction is upper
bounded by 1
pc
(pempc + p
mq
c + p
sq
c H(e
sq
z |ex)). Therefore,
the secret key generation rate is lower bounded by
Sb = p
sq
c + p
dk
c − pcH(ex)− p
sq
c H(e
sq
z |ex). (4)
We emphasize that it is not necessary for Alice and Bob
to know which events correspond to each class of conclu-
sive results.
In the derivation of Eq. 4, we bounded Eve’s informa-
tion about Bob’s key. However, we could have instead
bounded Eve’s information about Alice’s key. In this
case, Eve has no information about the bit chosen by Al-
ice when she sends a vacuum states. But she could have
some information about Alice’s portion of the key cor-
responding to dark counts (unless Alice sent an empty
pulse). Using similar arguments, we obtain
Sa = p
sq
c + pcω0 − pcH(ex)− p
sq
c H(e
sq
z |ex). (5)
Combining Eq. 4 and Eq. 5, we obtain a new lower
bound for the secret key generation rate,
2 In the case of B92, it is easy to show that this assumption is nec-
essary, but it might be too strict for other protocols like PBC00,
BB84, and the six-state protocol.
3 For simplicity, we suppose that the dark count rates are uniform
over all detectors and that they are independent of other mea-
surement results. If dark count rates differ from detectors, we
suggest two options. In one, Bob uses a random transforma-
tion to switch the role of the detectors in the measurement. For
example, in BB84, Bob could apply, at random, an extra Y op-
eration on the received qubits to switch the role of the detectors
when measuring in the {|0〉, |1〉} and {|+〉, |−〉} bases. A second
option is to bound Eve’s information from an estimate of the
probability that a detector fires relative to the others in the case
of a dark count. Assuming dark counts are independent of other
measurement results, in BB84 and the six-state protocol, with
only two detectors, Eve’s information is bounded by 1 − H(q)
where q is the probability that the first detector fires in the case
of a dark count. It is interesting to note that if Eve has some
control over the probability q and could change it from one dark
count event to another, then, by entropic concavity, Eve’s infor-
mation is bounded by 1 −H(qaveworst), where q
ave
worst is the worst
estimate of the average of q. Determining the value of qaveworst can
be very hard, but it is related to the level of confidence that Al-
ice and Bob have on their ability to counter or detect Eve if she
tries to change the properties of the detectors. Similarly, if dark
counts are correlated to other measurement results, we can upper
bound Eve’s information with restrictions on the correlati
4S = max[Sa, Sb]. (6)
Remark that the concavity of entropy and ω1e
1
z =
psq
pc
esqz + (ω1 −
psq
pc
)edkz imply that ω1H(e
1
z|ex)) >
psq
pc
H(esqz |ex) + (ω1−
psq
pc
)H(edkz |ex). We can rewrite this
as ω1(1 − H(e
1
z|ex)) 6
psq
pc
(1 − H(esqz |ex)), since it can
be argued that edkz =
1
2
. Therefore, the secret key gen-
eration rate given by Eq. 5 (and Eq. 6) is always greater
than or equal to the one given by Eq. 2.
To evaluate Eq. 6, Alice and Bob must be able to de-
termine all quantities involved in it. For this purpose,
we study two different situations: Alice has a source that
emits a single photon on demand or one that follows a
Poisson distribution.
In both situations, ex is estimated from test bits, and
pdkc can be calculated from the predetermined dark count
probability C of the detectors and the number of empty
pulses not associated with dark counts that Bob receives.
If C is not fixed, Bob might block his detection units ran-
domly and estimate pdkc from these results. For this to
be true, it is important that Eve is not allowed to reduce
the dark count probability without being detected. But
is this a valid assumption? In practice, Eve could try to
cool down the detectors or send bright pulses to disable
them at will. Furthermore, there might be some uncer-
tainty in the measurement of pdkc , even in the absence of
an eavesdropper. Since a dark count could be interpreted
as Eve sending a random state to Bob, we remark that
lower bounds for C and pdkc are sufficient to obtain a bet-
ter key generation rate using Eq. 6. Establishing a high
level of confidence on a lower bound for pdkc seems very
hard in practice. However, it might be possible through
experimental research and tests on reducing dark count
rates of detectors.
If Alice has a source that emits single photons, ω0 = 0
and pmqc = 0, then Eq. 6 reduces to Eq. 4 and ex =
1
pc
(psqc e
sq
x + p
dk
c e
dk
x ), where e
dk
x is the bit error rate over
conclusive events associated with dark counts. edkx =
1
2
which implies that Bob can estimate esqx from the value of
ex measured on test bits. H(e
sq
z |ex) = H(e
sq
z |e
sq
x ) can be
evaluated depending on the protocol used. It can easily
be shown that, for the six-state protocol, esqx = e
sq
y =
esqz [12]. For BB84, e
sq
x = e
sq
z and 0 6 e
sq
y 6 2e
sq
x [8]. For
PBC00, it was shown that esqz =
5
4
esqx and
1
4
esqx 6 e
sq
y 6
9
4
esqx [11].
In the absence of errors due to dark counts, pdkc = 0.
By solving S(ex) = 0, we find that the bit error rate
threshold is 12.6% for the six-state protocol, 11.0% for
BB84, and 9.81% for PBC00. If we now suppose that
esqx is fixed, then the bit error rate threshold increases as
shown in Tab. I. Note that the bit error rate threshold
depends on the contribution of errors not associated to
dark counts.
Tab. I reflects the potential of a special analysis for
dark counts. For any of the previous QKD protocols, if
TABLE I: Bit error rate thresholds for BB84, PBC00, and the
six-state protocol using a single-photon source and assuming
fixed values of esqx , which is the bit error rate of the results
not associated with dark counts.
e
sq
x = 0 e
sq
x = 0.01 e
sq
x = 0.1
PBC00 50% 43% -
BB84 50% 44% 13%
Six-State Protocol 50% 46% 19%
the errors are only caused by dark counts (esqx = 0), then
the bit error rate threshold is 1
2
, which implies there is
no bound on the distance for communication. However,
we must keep in mind that this result is derived using
many special conditions. In practice, esqx is non-zero and,
since there is decoherence in the channel and extrinsic
sources of background noise, esqx usually increases with
the distance of communication. We also assumed that
Alice and Bob perfectly know the dark counts rates of
their detectors, that they are the same for all detectors,
that they are independent of other measurements, and
that Eve cannot lower them. However, even if one or
more of these assumptions are not respected, it is still
possible to slightly modify Eq. 6, as we explained earlier,
and obtain an improvement over Eq. 2.
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FIG. 1: Semi-log graph of the key generation rate of PBC00, BB84,
and the six-state protocol as a function of distance, l, for esqx = 0.01
and C = 10−6 calculated using the old method (Eq. 2) and the new
one (Eq. 6) assuming a perfect single-photon source (pmqc = 0).
In Fig. 1, we observe that the new method of calcu-
lating the key generation rate, using Eq. 6, improves the
achievable distance for PBC00, BB84, and the six-state
protocol assuming a single-photon source. For simplic-
ity, we suppose that the dark count probability, C, is
the same for all detectors and that esqx is fixed and in-
dependent of distance. We assume no qubit losses at
5l = 0, where l is the length of the channel, and neglect
events when two different detectors fire simultaneously.
Under these conditions, for BB84 and the six-state pro-
tocol, psqc ≈ η and p
dk
c ≈ 2C(1−η), where η = e
−Al is the
probability that a photon successfully travels through the
channel and A is the attenuation in the fiber. For PBC00,
psqc ≈
1
2−ex η and p
dk
c ≈ 2C(1 − η). Note that, since
pdkc
pc
is always equal or higher in PBC00 than for BB84
or the six-state protocol, PBC00’s maximum achievable
distance is lower for the same bit error rate.
We now consider the case where Alice uses a source
that follows a Poisson distribution (pmqc 6= 0). We only
provide the result for BB84, but our arguments are valid
for other QKD protocols, including B92, PBC00, and the
six-state protocol.
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FIG. 2: Semi-log graph of the key generation rate of BB84 as a
function of distance, l, for esqx = 0.01 and C = 10
−6 assuming a
Poissonian source and combined with the decoy state method with
µ¯ = 0.5. We compare the key generation rates calculated using
Eq. 2 and Eq. 6.
Decoy states [20] could be used to evaluate psqc and
esqx precisely. Ref. [21, 22] explain how Alice could
randomly vary the average photon number, µ, of her
source to obtain, from statistics, precise estimates of the
rate of conclusive results associated with single-photon
pulses, pcω, and the corresponding bit error rate, e
1
x.
psqc and e
sq
x can be easily derived from the following
two relations: pcω = p
sq
c + 2Ce
−µ¯µ¯(1 − η) and e1x =
e−µ¯µ¯(ηesqx + 2C(1 − η)e
dk
x )/(pcω), where µ¯ is the global
average photon number. Fig. 2 shows that the decoy
state method can also be improved by using Eq. 6.
If we don’t use decoy states, a worst case estimate of
psqc and e
sq
x is possible. However, Eq. 6 provides only
a small improvement since, without decoy states, multi-
photon pulses are usually a much more important limit-
ing factor than dark counts.
In this paper, we showed that a high confidence in
the stability of the dark counts of the detectors against
the possible attack of an eavesdropper implies a signifi-
cant increase of the robustness of most QKD protocols
against dark counts, one of most important contributors
of noise in quantum communication. We studied partic-
ularly the cases of PBC00, BB84 and the six-state pro-
tocol. We explained how to get an improvement of the
secret key generation rate and of the achievable distance
in some non-ideal situations, including when Alice uses
a Poissonian photon source, when Alice and Bob know
only a lower bound for the dark count rates of their de-
tectors, and when the dark count rates are not uniform
over the detectors. Further improvements to the secret
key generation rate might come from using two-way error
correction [23] and by artificially adding some errors in
the key [24].
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